The Role of The '*Ulama*' in Modern Islamic Society

An Historical Perspective

By Abdulwahab Saleh Babeair

ALTHOUGH ISLAM IS the religion of moderation, a proclivity towards exremism has characterized major modern Islamic intellectual movements. In leading the fight against the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, Maulana Mohamed Ali portrayed the *dar al-harb* (non-Muslim world) following World War I as moving towards extremism. He saw the two great twentieth-century camps forming, the one of capitalism and the other of communism: " Whether it is oil, whether it is Bolshevism, that suggest this policy [of attacking the Caliphate]".[1] The war which was to end all wars and unite mankind brought forth feeble unifying emblems, such as the League of Nations, and an expedient hypocritical application of the great principle for which the war was supposedly fought, "the great principle of self-determination."[2] Mohamed Ali showed the hypocrisy and expediency of the application of this principle: "In spite of Montenegro's desire for independence, she is assured that it is better in her own interest to be part of a larger unit. When we ask that the Arabs should not be forced to get out of the larger unit [of the Caliphate] we are told by Lloyd George: 'Is the sacred principle of self-determinism not to be applied to an Arab simply because he is a Muslim?,'"[3] a telling exposure of the double standards of the world-shaping Western leaders.

Because of its unity, the *dar al-salam* (Muslim world) must be "dismembered" with here "a British Protectorate" and there a "French or American mandate"[4], Mohamed Ali noted. In the extremist-bent world, the leaders of the *dar al-harb* could not allow a bastion of solidarity. They had to foist the extemism towards which the Western world was drifting on the *dar al-salam*. What is implicit in Mohamed Ali's conception of the Caliphate is that through it the organic unity of religion and state is preserved. The caliphate insured that the individual, the group, and the larger units of the *ummah* (the

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community of Islam) do not "get out of step … not turn deviationist," as Wilfred Cantwell Smith writes.[5] The most important characteristic of the *ummah* – Unity-in-Diversity – must be preserved. Without it, as Mohamed Ali foresaw, the Islamic world would become what the West wanted it to become, not "an organized unit", but "a complex" comprising … several distinct major communities."[6]

It is not just that the *dar al-harb* ploy of introducing an exploiting extremism worked politically. Certainly, in the colonial period, the major strategy of the colonialists was to encourage controlled internal fighting and the formation of political factions: diversity as diversion, extremism as expediency. And just as certainly, this rivalry has continued in the post-colonial period, again with the encouragement of the *dar al-harb,* until Muslims "find themselves victims of Western neo-colonialism – politically, economically, and militarily dependent upon the superpowers – often seeming to be pawns in the struggle between the West and the Soviet Union."[7]

However, I believe the political implications of the dismembering of the Islamic *ummah* following World War I have been overshadowed by the intellectual consequences. While extreme political solutions – apathy or rebellion – have always been political options in Islamic communities, doctrinal extremism was traditionally controlled, through the acceptance of the *hadith*, "The differences of opinion among the learned within my community are [a sign of] God's Grace."[8] The Sunni-Shi'i split or the development of such sects or movements as Khawarij, Ibadiyah, the Druze, or Sufism did not result in schism. Sectarian differences of opinions were generally tolerated as long as the sects recognized God and His Messenger, as transmitted in the Qur'an and *hadiths.* Sects might be castigated, but the Caliphs seldom made attempts to destroy them unless a sect represented a clear challenge to the Caliph or unless the sect tried to impose its distinctive interpretation on others.

The authority of the Caliphate by itself or later through the Sultanate insured that doctrinal extremism, whatever its merit, would be contained. For better or worse, it would not be allowed to disturb the "order of things". Whether or not the Western post-World War I *dar al-harb* leaders foresaw the intellectual consequences of disbanding the Caliphate (as Mohamed Ali surely did), I believe the consequences have been manifested in the extremism which has dominated Islamic intellectual movements in the post-Caliphate period.

The contrasting monikers placed on these movements – modernism vs. fundamentalism or neo-fundamentalism, normativism vs. acculturationism, revivalism vs. retrenchmentism, Westernism vs. Islamism[9]– attest to the prevalence of this extremism, as do the names and ideologies of certain groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, *Jama'at-i Islami,* or Hizbullah, which encircle a minority to the exclusion of the majority of Muslims. The moderation of the Caliphate era promoted Unity-in-

Diversity by recognizing both as being compatible and desirable. This moderation so characteristic of historic Islam has become ingrained in the Islamic masses: they view extemism characteristically with caution, and are puzzled when an intellectual movement tries to convince them that they, at one with God, have become dichotomized.[10]

My contention is that a bifurcation has developed: the intellectualization of Islam in the modern world has been separated from the reality of Islam. Islam has not "failed" (or else it would not be the fastest growing religion in the world today),[11] but it has succeededin spite of modern attempts at its intellectualization. I believe that both major strands of modern Islamic intellectualization – the modernists and the neo-fundamentalists – have been so combative with each other that they have failed to see that they are "out of step" with the Islamic masses. To exemplify this proclivity toward extremism, I have chosen to concentrate on how both modernists and neo-fundamentalists approach the role of the 'ulama' in contemporary Islam.

The Traditional Roles of The 'Ulama'

In times of extremism, forces of moderation are the first to be attacked. Thus, it is not surprising the the 'ulama'– locked in as guardians of the past and of the present, as assessors of tradition and innovation and as mediators between the Islamic ruler and the masses – should be assailed. Their traditional roles, as Gibb and Bowen write, are "by their learning [to]safeguard the principles upon which the religious institution was grounded, and by their manner of life [to] win the respect and affection of the people.'[12] They defined, according to Daniel Crecelius, "the limits to which law and custom could accommodate innovation or deviation from the ideal," retaining a" traditional 'veto' power".[13]

Historically, the 'ulama' have not opposed innovation and have promoted ideological toleration. In the early history of Islam, innovators would "often find allies in the 'ulama', "who would ensure their basic orthodoxy and guarantee that their philosophical differences would not promote "heretical excesses" among the populace.[14] Even the supposed closing of the gates of *ijtihad* (independent analysis or reasoning) after the tenth century did not stifle ideological pluralism. *Bid'a* (innovation) might be castigated, but as long as the innovators did not transgress to total *hawa* (capriciouness) or *ghulu* (exaggeration) they were tolerated. For instance, the Sunni *'Ulama'* very early decided not to label Shi'ites as *El-Mobtadeen* ("those who sought to bring into Islam exaggerated or capricious ideas or practices which had no roots in the Qur'an or Sunnah").[15] The same was true of other sects, whose converts were not barred from performing *hajj* as long as as they recognized God and His Messenger as transmitted in the Qur'an and *hadiths*. *'Ulama'* castigation led to persecution only when a sect sought to impose its distinctive interpretation on others.

Similar toleration has been exercised by the *'ulama'* in their role as "mediators between political power and the civil society."[16] They have tolerated and even worked with oppressive rulers who paid only lip sevice to Islam. In some instances, their service to the ruler has even been called "suicidal", as when the higher Ottoman *'ulama'* of Selim III and Mahmud II helped write and implement Sultanate reform programs which were inimical to "the interest of their corps".[17] In Egypt, the higher *'ulama'*issued *fatwas* in the 1960's justifying Nasser's socialism and fifteen years later *fatwas*justifying Sadat's capitalism.[18]

Scholars fequently say the basis of such contradictory political actions is Al-Ghazzali's Doctrine of Necessity which counsels

that public tolerance of even a bad ruler is preferable to anarchy and civil war. Ibn Taymiyah wrote that sixty years of an unjust ruler is better thatn one day without a ruler,[19] and Tastushi, a Muslim lawyer from Spain, wrote: "Forty years of tyranny are better than one year of anarchy."[20] The argument of necessity seems to spring from a practical basis: the masses may suffer under an Islamic tyrant, but they would suffer more under chaotic conditions. I believe Al-Ghazzali's doctrine has a more theoretical basis which explains the traditional political attitude of the *'ulama'*. They do not principally distinguish between rulers on moral grounds (good/bad) or attitudinal grounds (demophilic/tyrannic), but orthodoxically (faithful/deviational)/ Chaos is not less preferable because it causes more suffering, but because it is a mirror of the *jahiliyya* (period of ignorance) of the pre-Islamic world. It is this orthodoxical threat of chaos that has historically led *'ulama'* to advocate political accomodation.

Modernists and the 'Ulama'

This traditional spirit of toleration and accommodation has made the modern *'ulama'* the subject of attacks by both modernists and neo-fundamentalists. Modernists have decreed them as "old-fashioned, irrelevant and unable to cope with the modern world:" their knowledge is "obsolete", thus making them "obstacles to progress".[21] They are partly responsible, from a modernist perspective, for the "inherited ignorance" in the Muslim World.[22] Both Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Iqbal believed the *'ulama's* traditional education and conservatism resulted in an inadequate understanding of and response to the demands of modernity.[23] Some of the *'ulama'*, according to Abdul Monem El-Nemur, have driven people from the idea that Islam is the focal point of life; these people have become frustrated with the *'ulama's* interpretation of Islam and find the *'ulama'* cowardly in their interpretation or hesitancy to interpret.[24] They had turned Islam, Muhammad Nuwayhi writes, into a religion "of intellectual petrification and social stagnation."[25] Shari'ati also found the *'ulama'* indifferent to "the modern situation" and unable "to communicate effectively with Iranian youth".[26] Shari'ati, like Iqbal, censured the *'ulama'* for confining their energies to "the hair-splitting discussion about minor details of ritual".[27] in Abdullah Laroui's words, the *'ulama'* had "separated dogma from life".[28]

The thrust of the modernists' assault has been to diminish the influence of the *'ulama'* in the political arena. Paradoxically, the *'ulama'*, historically viewed as purveyors and protectors of Islamic tradition, often found themselves attacked as being an imposed Islamic institution. Nuwayhi writes that "an official priestly caste" is "alien to Islam", but such a caste he contends developed "during the days of the decline of Islamic civilization".[29] Nasser questioned what purpose the *'ulama'* serve: "Of course the shaykh does not think of anything except the turkey and the food with which

he filled his belly. He is no more than a stooge of reaction, feudalism and capitalism. At that time some shaykhs were trying to deceive us with *fatwas* of this nature. From the beginning, Islam was a religion of work… The Prophet used to work like everyone else. Islam was never a profession".[30] Qaddafi attacked Libyan *'ulama'* as "footdrag[gers] in the revolution" and accused them of "propagat[ing] heretical tales elaborated over centuries of decadence … which distort the Islamic religion."[31] Shakid Arslam censors the corruption of the *'ulama'* class which should be the "guardians of the faith".[32]

The purpose of such politically-motivated attacks was to discredit the *'ulama'* in the eyes of the masses. Unlike previous secularist movements, which sought reformation by by-passing or circumventing the *'ulama'*, modernists sought confrontation: "They were willing to contest the control of religious institutions with *'ulama'*, to dialogue their concepts and interpretations in open debate, and to entangle them in a struggle for the moral and cultural leadership of the masses".[33] One form of confrontation was to promote the concept that the *'ulama'* were divorced from the masses, that "within the domain of Islam" there is "an internal dichotomy between local or folk Islam and the Islam of the elite, or 'ulama'".[34] The *'ulama'* function on the level of theoretical ethics, imperceptible to the Islamic masses: "the ethical constructs of the *'ulama'*… have little bearing on [the] problems of the majority of the population".[35] Another form was to declare, with Shari'ati, that the *'ulama'* possess no official status, no inherent power or hereditary rights. They are originally individual scholars who have come into being in Muslim societies 'out of necessity and not officially', deriving their influence from the people who gave it to them on their own free will".[36] Shari'ati's concept of the *'ulama'*

challenges their "official" status in Muslim society; it sets up a relationship of temporal *'ulama'*/temporal Islamic masses, instead of the one which traditionally the *'ulama'* had accepted: permanent *'ulama'*/permanent Islamic truth.

Fazlur Rahman's interpretation of *ijma'* extends this challenge to the *'ulama'* by questioning, not their status, but their *raison d'etre*. He writes, "The claims of many *'ulama'* that Islamic legislation is a function properly belonging to the *'ulama'*, is not only patently wrong but is equally falsified by the formative phase of the development of Muslim law in history." In that formative period, "*ijma'* was regarded as the *ijma'* of the community and not of the *'ulama'* alone until well after the second century of Hijrah when the concept of the *ijma'* of the *'ulama'* replaced that of the Community. The task of the *'ulama'* is, in fact, not to legislate or veto legislation (since no such right exists in Islam), but to "help create and formulate ideas (*ijtihad*)," which "will be discussed widely in the Community" and "when a general public opinion, i.e., *ijma'*, has crystallized, this will be embodied in the form of law by the representatives of the

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people. Such law will be perfectly Islamic law."[37] Rahman's concept sets up a relationship whereby the the temporal Islamic masses, of which the *'ulama'* are only one functionary, determine the prevailing interpretation and manifestation of permanent Islamic truth.

In this modernist "democratic" conceptualization of the *'ulama'*, the *'ulama'* are seen as deriving their authority from the people (Shari'ati's concept) and as being the conduit of the people's wishes which they cannot veto (Rahman's concept). The goal of the modernists becomes not just to make the *'ulama'* "government functionaries" whose purpose is to provide "a religious justification or apologetic of the regime" in power (Haddad's description of the *'ulama'* in Egypt after the Al-Azhar reforms of 1961).[38] Historically *'ulama'* have been forced at time to adopt this functionary role out of their fear of *jahiliyya*-promoting chaos. The ultimate goal of the modernists is more sinister; it is to convince the masses that the *'ulama'* are redundant and thus not needed. The solutions of the modernists centred around such catchwords as *immediacy, expediency, democracy and temporality* and had no use for the *'ulama's* cautious, gradualistic, reflective, and permanent approach to the problems facing Muslim societies. When intolerance of the view which the 'ulama' were advocating: that the long-term, not just the short-term consequences of change should be evaluated. Taking the long view, the *'ulama'* have been resisters of the modernists' reforms not in the sense used by a politician of resistance as total opposition but in the sense used by a physicist of slowing down the passage of a body or substance through space.

Neo-Fundamentalist and the 'Ulama'

While the modernists' attacks on the *'ulama'* have been frequently noted, less documented are the views on the *'ulama'* of the second major intellectual group in contemporary Muslim society – the neo-fundamentalists. The *'ulama'* and the neo-fundamentalist would seem to be natural allies, both being part of what Haddad has called the normativist perspective which finds "the authority of the past valid for the present and the future" and which holds that "religion is not only the central part of life, it is the totality of life, that from which all of reality proceeds and has its meaning."[39] Both have resisted secularism and acculturating influences, unlike the modern acculturationists who "reinterpret [Islam's] fundamental teachings in such a way" as to sanction "the introduction of new ideas borrowed "from 'alien' cultures".[40]

However, many of the neo-fundamentalist thinkers have been as acrimonious in their attacks on the *'ulama'* as the modernists. Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani wrote that "our *'ulama'* at this time are like a very narrow wick on top of which is a very small flame that neither lights its surroundings nor gives light to others."[41] Mawdudi attacked their "conservatism" and refused to accord to them the role of final arbiters in Islamic matters.[42] Hassan al-Banna attacked their advocacy of *taqlid* (reliance on tradition),[43] and while the modernists had attacked the *'ulama'* for impeding change, the Muslim Brotherhood impugned the *'ulama'* for "their ineffectiveness" in confronting Western imperialism. Nasserist socialism, and recently Sadat's Western capitalism.[44] In Muslim Brotherhood writings, "the *'ulama'* were invariably described as *babbaghawat al-manabir* (pulpit parrots)", or "*wa juharrimun al-halal* (people who would reverse religious edicts to suit the whims of the rulers)".[45] Sayyid Qutb called them enemies of Islam since they pass themselves off as a professional clergy and added,"If Islam were to rule, the first act would be to banish the indolent who do no work", but make "a living in the name of religion".[46]

The similarity of Qutb's statement to the one quoted earlier by Nasser shows that the acculturationist modernizer and the neo-fundamentalist shared the same mode of attack on the *'ulama'*. In the same way, a contemporary Islamic revivalist, such as Hassan Turabi, makes use of the concepts of the *'ulama'* by the modernists Shari'ati and Rahman. Turabi writes: "What do I mean by *'ulama'*? The word historically has come to mean those versed in the legacy of religious revealed knowledge (*'ilm*). However, *'ilm* does not mean that alone. It means anyone who knows anything well enough to relate it to God. Because all knowledge is divine and religious, a chemist, an engineer, an economist, or a jurist are all *'ulama'*".[47]

The 'Ulama' as Moderationists

In essence, the modern-day *'ulama'* have been attacked because they will not "roll over and play dead", as the modernists want, nor will they "rally round the flag" of the neo-fundamental revivalists. They have insisted on playing the role traditionally assigned to them – that of social and ideological mediators. At the social level, in some Muslim countries the higher *'ulama'* have felt the pinches of tyranny and the middle and lower *'ulama'* are equally confronted with the twinges of popular protest. They have sought to control both impulses because they know that the licentiousness of the tyrant and the unbridled license of the masses can lead to *jahiliyya*-promoting anarchy, which above all the *'ulama'* are dedicated to prevent. They have let the ruler play his political game, engage in his experiment with socialism or capitalism or idiosyncratic hybrids, as long as he retained a commitment or even the veneer of a commitment to Islam. In most of this social experimentation, whether it was encouraged by modernists or revivalists, the *'ulama'* have seldom been facilitators, but they have also seldom been obstructionists.

Esposito comments: "While never totally successful, conservative religious leaders have managed to limit the scope of reform legislation. Moreover, while some *'ulama'* have accepted reforms, the more conservative have been content to bide their times until a more favorable period when Islamic law might once more be implemented".[48] The statement is perceptive in its delineation of the *'ulama'* as mediators, as those seeking to control excesses ("managed to limit the scope of reform legislation") and willing to compromise ("have accepted reforms"). However, the statement is less perceptive when it suggests that the *'ulama'* as mediators expect to be "totally successful" (the expectation of an extremist, not a mediator), that there is some sort of political discussion amont the *'ulama'* (a group which I have found has traditionally viewed the political process with distain), and that they are biders of time (a notion which in its similarity to Nasser's concept that the *'ulama'* are not Islamic "workers" belies their active involvement as controllers of extremist excesses). Modernists and neo-fundamentalists and their political agents can easily keep in motion the one ball which is all they see. The contemporary *'ulama'*, their vision not blindered to one ball only, have the more difficult task of juggling many balls in their quest to mediate a social balance.

Ideologically, the *'ulama'* have not discouraged pluralism. Far too much emphasis has been placed on the few instances where the al-Azhar *'ulama'* have used their censoring power".[49] While some would turn Fazlur Rahman into a "martyr" to modernism who was driven from his office as Director of Pakistan's Central Institute of Islamic Research by the country's *'ulama'*[50] and others would turn Sayyid Qutb into a "martyr (shahid) of the Islamic revival"[51], what is forgotten is how long the

'ulama' establishment allowed Rahman's and Qutb's ideological perspectives to circulate. This tolerance of the 'ulama' is manifested in neither the modernists not the neo-fundamentalists, both of whom have curtly dismissed the 'ulama' as antiquated when the 'ulama' would not adopt totally their respective viewpoints. When the 'ulama' refused to become part of their extremist vision, both groups dismissed the 'ulama' as significant Islamic players[52] and therafter took little notice of their perspective. However, the 'ulama', continuing their historical tradition of pluralism, have studied, considered, debated and even encouraged aspects of both extremist perspectives as Donohue's survey of the writings in religious journals in the Arab world from 1945-1970 shows.[53]

The 'ulama' have approached neither the modernists nor the neo-fundamentalists with the closed minds so prevalent in these two groups. When the modernists promoted television the 'ulama' accepted it after consideration which showed that it could be used to facilitate Islamic teaching. When Modernism pushed forward those "alien" western inventions, the car and airplane, the 'ulama' accepted them after consideration, seeing that both could facilitate Muslim observance of at least two of the five pillars – communal daily prayers at mosques and the

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pilgrimage to Makkah. However, when modernist politicians dictated that an alien industry be located in a traditional rural community, the 'ulama' debated its long-term benefits and questioned its cultural-shock consequences. For this, they are said to be "obstacles to progress".

Similarly, the 'ulama' have carefully considered the neo-fundamental revivalists' position. Because of their religious training, they, more so than the laity among the revivalists, are aware of the need for *tajdid* (renewal) and *islah* (reform).[54] However, while the revivalists, in the days following Khomeini's entry into Tehran, located the phenomena in the political arena, the 'ulama' were concerned about the social and personal need for *tajdid* and *islah* – increasing the righteousness of the community and of the individual. Furthermore, the 'ulama' have considered the revivalists' assessment of the modern Muslim world. Political battles have been won and lost throughout the history of Islam, and certainly the 1967 Arab-Israeli war was a loss for the Muslim community, but to magnify the loss and make it so "catastrophic" that it heralded "the collapse of faith in the future and despair over any means of survival"[55] probably struck the 'ulama' as as example of exaggeration and as a lack of faith on the part of the revivalists in the greatness of Islam and the resilience of the Islamic peoples. Similarly, when a revivalist such as Khurshid Ahmad finds all of "Muslim society… devoid of moral values and … rife with corruption,"[56] and others find economic chaos, poverty, rampant illiteracy and overpopulation,[57] the 'ulama' question if this is a realistic assessment. Since through the middle and lower 'ulama' there is *ulama'ic* representation at all levels of society, the 'ulama' know that significantly more Arab Muslim children are now attending school than ever before (the rise has been from 10% in 1914 to more than 70%

today) and that literacy has also dramatically risen (from 5% to 50% in the same period).[58]

The people may complain to the *'alim* that they cannot make ends meet, but the lower *'ulama'* have probably always heard that complaint. The *'ulama'* conclude that Yes, times are bad, but they ask if they are the "worst" as the revivalists would have everyone believe. Are radical reforms and a French revolutionist storming of the gates of *ijtihad* (advocated by both revivalists and modernists), with the prospect of letting loose the demons of *hawa* (capriciousness) and *ghulu* (exaggeration), needed? At this point, each *'alim* stops, considers, debates, discusses, and reflects. That he or the *'ulama'* as a group do not rush out to act, with capriciousness and exaggeration as both modernists and revivalist would do and would have him/them do, is in itself a significant manifestation of action. To label this actions as "political quietism" or to conclude that it shows that the *'ulama'* "have come to realize that the world has passed them by"[59] is not to grasp what that most detached, most unbiased and most brilliant Western observer of Islam when he wrote that "the future of Islam rests where it has rested in the past" – on the orthodox *'ulama'*.

Summary

In this paper I have tried to show the following:

1) That extremism is not historically indigenous to the Islamic community, which, while encouraging ideological pluralism, has developed ways to control and curb this pluralism so that it never reached the point of *ghulu* and *hawa*.

2) That in abetting the disbandment of the Caliphate after world War I, *dar al-harb* Western leaders advertently or inadvertently foisted extremism on the Muslim world.

3) That ideological bipolarization, not ideological pluralism, characterizes the modern islamic erea which has been dominated by intellectual capriciousness and exaggeration, wavering and anaemia, and pretension and intolerance, none of which were dominant in pre-modern Islamic history.

4) That the *'ulama'* have had the thankless task of trying to control this procilivity toward polarization and in the process have incurred the wrath of the two principal agents of ideological extermism – the modernists and the revivalists.

My conclusion is that the principal problem facing the Islamic community today is not political or social or economic; nor is it the debate over modernism or revivalism. The paramount issue is ideological: how to control extremism and thereby contain polarization and promote ideological pluralism and toleration which have traditonally flourished in the *ummah*. The modern Islamic community has listened so long to the Western charcterizations of it as a fanatical society [61] that it has come to act out this stereotype. Since what the *dar al-harb* thinks of the *dar al-salam* is, or should be, irrelevant, the *ummah* must direct its attention to two more relevant questions: Has the community drifted from the Islamic ideal of moderation? and if so, what can be done to control this un-Islamic procilivity toward extremism? When these questions are answered, the jump-starts, the sudden tuns, the acrimonious pushing and shoving and the limp finishes which have charcterized the poltical and social courses of modern Islamic countries will, I believe, cease.

NOTES

[1] Maulana Mohamed Ali, *Selected Speeches and Statements of Maulana Mohamed Ali*, ed. by Afzal Iqbal (Lahore: N.P., 1963) 1963), II, p.44

2 Ibid, p.43

3 Ibid, p.43

4 Ibid, p.44

5 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.20

6 Ibid, p.296

7 John L. Esposito, "Islam and Muslim Politics," in *Voices of Resurgent Islam,* ed. by John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p.12.

8 Jalal al-din al-Suyuti, Al Jami' al Saghir, quoted in Muhammad Asad, *The Principles of State and Government in Islam,* (Gibraltar: N.P., 1980), p.48.

9 Susan Waltz, "Islamist Appeal in Tunisia," *The Middle East Journal,* 40 (1986), p.651, and Henry Munson, Jr., "The Social Base of Islamic Militancy in Morocco," *The Middle East Journal,* 40 (1986), p.269, review the terminology being used today.

10 For typical statements of this sense of dichotomy, see Khurshid Ahmad, "The Mature of Islamic Resurgence," in *Voices of Resurgent Islam.* op. cit., p.224: "Muslim society is divided between modern and conservative, between the new and the old, the westernizing and the traditional", and Najib Mahfuz, " El-Jidal Hamwal Al-Sharia", El-Ahran, May 7, 1965, p.5, that a "cultural schizophrenia" has developed in Egypt because of the tug-of-war between conflicting manifestations of Islamic and western values. [all translations from Arabic sources in this article are my own.]

11 William A. Bijlefeld, "On Being Muslim" p.32, in *The Islamic Impact.* eds. Yvonne Yazbeck Hadda, Byron Haines and Ellison Findly (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1984) cites estimates that the Muslim population will increase by 477 million from 1980 to 2000.

12 H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West,* Vol.1, Part II (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p.81

13 Daniel Crecelius, "The Course of Secularization in Modern Egypt," in *Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical Change,* ed. by John L. Esposito (Syracuse N.Y.: syracuse University Press, 1980), p.51.

14 Malise Ruthven, *Islam in The World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p.99.

15 *Bid'a, Daerat El-Maeret El-Islamyeh,* eds. Ibrahim Zaki, Ahmed Shentnawy and Abdulhamed Younes, VI, 1969, p.415.

16 Eqbal Ahmed, "Islam and Politics" in *The Islamic Impact,* op.cit., p.16.

17 Uriel Heyd, *The Ottoman 'Ulama' and Westernization in the time of Selim III and Mahmud II,* Scripta Hieroslymitana, 4 (1961), p.76. see also Majdi Abdul Majeed El-Safoury, Sagout El-Dawleh El-Othmanyeh *Athareh ala El-Daewa El-Islamyeh* (Cairo: Dar El-Sahwah Lel-Nasher, 1990), passim, particularly pp.153-154, on how the silence of the '*ulama*' contributed to the decline of the Ottoman Empire.

18 Eric Davis, "Ideology, Social Class and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt," in *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam,* ed. by said Amir Arjomand (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1984), pp.148-149; and John Waterbury, "Egypt: Islam and Social Change", in *Change in the Muslim World,* ed. by Philip H. Stoddard, David C. Cuthell and Margaret W. Sullivan (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981), p.58.

19 Quoted in Mohammed Emareh, *Tayrat El-Faker El-Islami.* (Cairo: Dar El-Shouroug, 1991), p.154.

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